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Abstract. This paper explores the history of radio echo-sounding (RES), a technique of
glaciological surveying that from the late 1960s has been used to examine Antarctica’s
sub-glacial morphology. Although the origins of RES can be traced back to two accidental
findings, its development relied upon the establishment of new geopolitical conditions, which
in the 1960s typified Antarctica as a continent devoted to scientific exploration. These con-
ditions extended the influence of prominent glaciologists promoting RES and helped
them gather sufficient support to test its efficiency. The organization and implementation of a
large-scale research programme of RES in Antarctica followed these developments. The paper
also examines the deployment of RES in Antarctic explorations, showing that its completion
depended on the availability of technological systems of which RES was an integral part.
The publication of Antarctica’s Glaciological and Geophysical Folio in 1983 revealed
the dimensions of the ice sheet that covers a large portion of the Earth’s southernmost
continent as well as the characteristics of its sub-glacial morphology.1 Beneath the white
and pristine Antarctic surface an entire new world was uncovered in greater resolution
than ever previously possible, a world made of valleys, mountains, lakes and plateaux
in which the ice goes as deep as 4,776 metres. These revelations were realized through
airborne radar depth (or radio echo) sounding, in which radio wave pulses are reflected
at the ice base. Scientists and historians alike have only just begun to appreciate the
importance of radio echo-sounding (RES) in Antarctica. The continent accounts for
approximately 90 per cent of all ice on earth – around 70 per cent of its fresh water. An
appreciation of the likely response of the ice sheet to future climate changes is clearly
urgent. Such appreciation requires numerical modelling of the ice sheet, making RES
data vital to any study that sets out to understand variations in sea levels and climate.
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Given the recent scientific and political debates on these changes, as well as the current
scientific activities in the context of the International Polar Year (2007–8), these data
today acquire even greater significance.2
Historians can look back at the radio echo-sounding of Antarctica as another im-
portant example of twentieth-century ‘big science’, since this was the largest single
surveying project to be run in Antarctica between 1967 and 1979.3 Funded by the US
National Science Foundation (NSF), the scientific programme was organized by the
Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) of the University of Cambridge. The US Navy
provided a long-range aircraft to travel above nearly nine million square kilometres of
ice and from 1974 the Technical University of Denmark designed sophisticated RES
devices better to sound the Antarctic. So large international organizations, prominent
governmental establishments, leading research centres and the military and industry of
powerful nations all contributed to make the discovery of sub-glacial Antarctica poss-
ible. In so doing they substantially enlarged the scale of basic glaciological fieldwork.
Yet the early days of RES were far less majestic. Indeed, the technique emerged from
the terrible recurrence of aircraft accidents and an equally sorry series of experimental
errors. In the 1950s radar altimeters used during flights over the poles worked errati-
cally on plateaux covered with ice. As the ice sheet is almost transparent to radio waves
the instruments frequently recorded the bottom surface rather than altitude above the
ice. Reading the wrong height, pilots at times descended to land and sometimes crashed
as a consequence (Figure 1). While exploring the instruments’ defects so as to save
precious lives and aircraft, researchers realized the potential of radar altimeters in ver-
tical measurements, giving birth to the new technique of ice sounding.
The fact that accidents account for the origins of RES reminds us of the heuristic
value of errors in experimental research and of how errors can bring about scientific
and technological change. We certainly know a great deal about how technologies can
adapt and be adapted to new environments and tasks, either by purposeful construction
of new artefacts or by serendipitously exploiting the hidden properties of existing ones.4
The available literature shows examples of adaptation by transfer or remodelling and
culminates in the evolutionary approach to technological change illustrated by George
Basalla.5 However, our treatment of the origins of RES adds a novel element to these
2 See R. Fifield, International Research in the Antarctic, Oxford, 1987, 36–7; G. E. Fogg, A History of
Antarctic Science, Cambridge, 1992.
3 We use the term ‘big science’ with reference to the use of long-range aircraft as a polar research ‘lab-
oratory’ to cover the entirety of the Antarctic continent. We also refer to the setting up of large teams of
administrators, pilots, technicians and scientists to fulfil the research task assigned. This does not necessarily
imply that our case study is comparable budgetarily with other well-known examples of big science such as
high-energy physics. On big science see P. Galison and B. Hevly (eds.), Big Science: The Growth of Large-
Scale Research, Stanford, 1992; D. de Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science, New York, 1963.
4 On serendipity see R. K. Merton and E. Barber, The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity: A Study in
Sociological Semantics and the Sociology of Science, Princeton, 2004; R. M. Roberts, Serendipity: Accidental
Discoveries in Science, New York, 1989. On serendipity in big science see C. Westfall, ‘A tale of two more
laboratories : readying for Fermilab and Jefferson Laboratory’, Historical Studies in the Physical and
Biological Sciences (2002), 32, 369–407.
5 On technology transfer see T. P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society,
1880–1930, Chicago, 1983, 47–78; G. Basalla, The Evolution of Technology, Cambridge, 1989.
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arguments by showing that when accidents and errors become the subject of scientific
enquiry, they can instigate a broader analysis of the range of applications associated
with the experimental apparatus in use and in turn favour its adoption more remotely
from its current domain.6
Even so, what conditions allowed a few experts tinkering with their flawed exper-
imental devices to enter big science? Here we demonstrate that it was, especially, the
opportunity to exploit new and compelling political circumstances typifying Antarctica
that helped leading glaciologists in their quest to develop RES. After the International
Geophysical Year of 1957–8 (IGY), new structures of governance extended the in-
fluence of glaciologists in Antarctic affairs, allowing them to test the potential of
new devices. In turn, the Cold War promoted scientific collaboration and competition,
creating a climate in which US funding bodies and the military were receptive to
the idea of helping glaciologists in their quest for a large-scale survey of Antarctica’s
sub-glacial morphology using the new sounding technique. Clearly, given the existence
of US military activities and interests in polar environments, several scientific
Figure 1. A US Navy R4D crashed at Hallett Station, October 1960. From J. C. Behrendt, The
Ninth Circle : A Memoir of Life and Death in Antarctica, 1960–1962, Albuquerque, 2005, p. i.
Reproduced with permission of Prof. Behrendt.
6 For an analysis of the heuristic value of errors in science see J. Schickore, ‘ ‘‘Through thousands of errors
we reach the truth’’ – but how? On the epistemic role of error in scientific practice’, Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science (2005), 36, 539–56. On the importance of error-making in computing see S. Mols,
‘Error-mindedness and the computerisation of crystallography, 1912–1955’, Ph.D. dissertation no. 27296,
University of Manchester, 2006.
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programmes had already developed by the time of the IGY.7 Yet it was because of the
interchange between science and international politics in Antarctica following the IGY
that glaciology became a central component of US foreign relations, fuelling the
patronage of those international scientific endeavours that now acquired diplomatic
and strategic significance. The gathering of basic geophysical data and the refining of
remote sensing technologies, including RES, thus served geopolitical as well as scientific
ends.8
Technological breakthroughs were also fundamental to RES’s trajectory. The
new sounding technique relied on the coordination of innovative technologies for
airborne transport and navigation, newly developed imaging technologies and newly
designed electronic equipment. In fact RES was only one piece in a network of equally
important technological components that were part of a purposely designed NSF
‘airborne laboratory’ which was aimed at being an innovative remote sensing
platform for polar studies.9 In the coordination and synchronization of the complex
technological system related to RES deployment in the field, serendipity gave way to
prediction. Accident was reduced to a minimum by rigorous preparation and clock-
work execution.
Our study thus examines the interplay of accidents and opportunities in the history of
RES, from its inception to its deployment in Antarctica and from its serendipitous
origins to its aftermath as a big-science project typified by political influence, predic-
tion, technological prowess and large investments.
Serendipity part I : the hidden returns of gross errors, 1955–60
The transparency of ice to certain radio frequencies was first identified in the late 1920s.
In 1927 a new method was developed to measure glacier ice thickness by electro-
dynamic means and in 1933 American explorers gathered indicators of the transparency
of ice to high-frequency radio waves at the Antarctic station of Little America on the
7 US military patronage of post-war Arctic and Antarctic research had been vital to the development of
important branches of the environmental sciences, including glaciology and geophysics; see R. Doel,
‘Constituting the postwar earth sciences: the military’s influence on the environmental sciences in the USA
after 1945’, Social Studies of Science (2003), 33, 638–40. For an overview of US patronage of European
scientific organizations in the post-war years see J. Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Recon-
struction of Science in Europe, Cambridge, MA, 2006.
8 In this respect our case parallels those of seismology, oceanography and cartography. See Kai-Henrik
Barth, ‘The politics of seismology: nuclear testing, arms control and the transformation of a discipline’, Social
Studies of Science (2003), 33, 743–81; J. D. Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War: The Disciples of
Marine Science, Seattle, 2005; J. Cloud and K. C. Clarke, ‘Through a shutter darkly: the tangled relationships
between civilian, military, and intelligence remote sensing in the early U.S. space program,’ in Secrecy and
Knowledge Production (ed. J. Reppy), Ithaca, NY, 1999, 36–56; J. Cloud, ‘American cartographic transfor-
mations during the Cold War’, Cartography and Geographic Information Science (2002), 29, 261–82. For a
similar case in biology see R. McLeod, ‘Strictly for the birds: science, the military and the Smithsonian’s
Pacific Biological Survey Program, 1963–1970’, Journal of the History of Biology (2001), 34, 315–52.
9 On relations between field and laboratory see R. Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the
Lab–Field Border in Biology, Chicago, 2002.
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Ross Ice Shelf.10 But lack of development in radio technologies and poor funding made
it impossible to explore the matter further. Indeed, it was quickly forgotten. It was
not until the 1950s that it suddenly re-emerged in the scientific literature for entirely
different reasons. Radio engineers realized that radar altimeters did not work efficiently
on Antarctic plateaux. Owing to the ice’s transparency to radio waves, altimeter read-
ings were sometimes erroneous, jeopardizing the safety of aircraft and their crews.
The radar altimeter was born out of wartime research. The Second World War
marked the development of new systems of radio detection and ranging (radar) in the
US and in Britain (known as RDF – radio direction finding), which assisted the better
manipulation of radio waves for military purposes. Radar systems were used in the
context of ground defence networks, but the provision of portable airborne systems was
also prioritized because of the new requirements of strategic bombing.11
Aside from their influence on military operations, radar technologies also trans-
formed altitude measurement, paving the way for the introduction of new apparatus
that would signal the height of an aircraft by transmitting radio pulses to the surface
and calculating altitude from the returning echo. Radar altimeters were first conceived
in the second half of the 1930s and fully developed in the 1940s. One of the conven-
tional models used by US military aircraft was the SCR 718.12 This portable radar
apparatus, an improved version of the SCR 618 and SCR 518 models (also named AYA,
or high altitude pulse altimeter), was designed as a technological aid in high-altitude
bombing, photographic mapping and terrain clearance. Radar altimetry developed in
the US thanks to institutions such as the US Army Signals Research Corps based in Fort
Monmouth, NJ and saw the involvement of a number of large US electronics firms.
Altimeters of the SCR 718 type were effective and reliable in normal conditions, but
functioned erratically on land or sea substantially covered with snow and ice. Some of
the first evidence of these problems emerged during Operation Highjump (1946–7),
which marked the first US attempt to train and overwinter in Antarctica. Organized by
the US Navy in the context of its Antarctic Development Program, the operation was
aimed at establishing US bases in Antarctica, thereby consolidating American sover-
eignty, and at gathering knowledge on Antarctica’s morphological, geographical and
geological features.13
But when Operation Highjump began and when new ‘Deep Freeze’ missions were
organized by the Navy every year from the mid-1950s, airborne logistical support for
10 W. Stern, ‘Principles, methods and results of electrodynamic thickness measurement of glacier ice’,
Zeitschrift für Gletscherkunde (1930), 18, 24. See also S. Evans, ‘Correspondence’, Polar Record (1963), 11,
795. On Little America’s observations see A. Waite and S. J. Schmidt, ‘Gross errors in height indication from
pulsed radar altimeters operating over thick ice or snow’, Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers,
IRE, June 1962, 1515–20.
11 New devices such as modulators (klystrons and cavity magnetrons) allowed the production of pulses of
high frequency (HF) or very high frequency (VHF) that also augmented the power of radar transmitters and
receivers. See R. Buderi, The Invention that Changed theWorld: The Story of Radar fromWar to Peace, New
York, 1996.
12 The acronym SCR is of unclear origins: a model produced by the US Army Signal Research Corps or just
‘Set, Complete, Radio’.
13 On Operation Highjump see L. A. Rose, Assault on Eternity: Richard E. Byrd and the Exploration of
Antarctica, 1946–1947, Annapolis, 1980. See also R. Doel, op. cit. (7).
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US explorations proved rather problematic. Pilots using pulsed-radar altimeters re-
ported ‘gross errors’ in the measurement of altitude and sometimes crashed as a
consequence. From 1955 to 1961 US missions in Antarctica experienced nineteen deaths
in aircraft accidents, many caused by poor visibility combined with dysfunctional radar
altimeter readings.14 For example, on Christmas Eve 1959 a US Navy R4D stalled and
crashed. The pilot had read forty feet instead of seventy, thereby thinking he was close
to landing. In the words of Antarctic explorer John C. Behrendt,
The pilot dropped the required 40 feet and felt a jerk … He thought that was the snow surface
so he cut the power. Because he was still 30 feet in the air, the plane stalled … One wing hit the
snow, recoiled to the other wing, and the whole plane turned violently and skidded forward.
Both wings were severed instantly, and when the fuselage finally came to stop, only the pilot
had sustained minor injury to his head.15
Work on faulty radar altimeters started in earnest in the very same institution that had
pioneered its development: the US Army Signals Corps research facility at Fort
Monmouth. Those military personnel who had worked in Antarctica in the context of
the US explorations instigated new research. In the mid-1950s US Army engineers
measured the ice’s electromagnetic properties and demonstrated that snow and ice were
transparent to frequencies between 1,000 and 10 MHz. This made the deployment of
radar altimeters problematic because it included the range (400 MHz) used by the SCR
718.16
It was mainly thanks to Amory ‘Bud’ Waite, one of Fort Monmouth’s radio en-
gineers, that the problems associated with radar altimetry on territories covered by
snow and ice were fully addressed. Waite was an expert in radar altimetry and a veteran
of polar missions. He had participated in eighteen polar expeditions, eight in Antarctica
and ten in the Arctic. In the 1950s Waite embarked on a five-year study of the trans-
parency of ice to radio waves. The reason for these faults was ascertained by Waite
thanks to an analysis of the reasons for radio penetration of ice. It became apparent
that, owing to the transparency of ice to radio waves, pulses were not reflected by the
ice plane but went through the ice and were reflected by the bottom surface beneath the
ice. It was the bottom surface that the aircraft radar actually measured.17
Thus Waite sought to achieve a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. He
pointed out the absence of surface indication when a plane flew closer than 250 feet to
the surface of Antarctica with ice thickness of 120 feet. Sometimes the problem existed
when the plane was between 200 and 800 feet. Radar altimeters could be ‘fatally
dangerous ’ to low-flying pilots.18
14 Only from 1970 did this rate drop significantly. J. C. Behrendt, The Ninth Circle: A Memoir of Life and
Death in Antarctica, 1960–1962, Albuquerque, 2005, 8.
15 Behrendt, op. cit. (14), 41. Quote taken from G. A. Doumani, The Frigid Mistress : Life and Exploration
in Antarctica, Baltimore, 1999.
16 Waite and Schmidt, op. cit. (10), 1520.
17 Waite and Schmidt, op. cit. (10), 1520. E. K. Gannett, ‘Radar Altimeters fooled by polar ice and snow’,
News Release from IRE, 20 March 1961.
18 Waite and Schmidt, op. cit. (10), 1517.
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But the analysis of the SCR 718’s erroneous performance helped Waite uncover its
hidden qualities : it could be extremely effective at taking vertical measurements. While
alerting US authorities to the dangers of flying in Antarctica, Waite also considered the
scientific benefits to be derived from the application of radar altimeters to surveys of
Antarctic territories. Between 1957 and 1959 Waite’s modified radar altimeter was first
deployed to carry out ice measurements in Antarctica, thus showing that a device that
was hazardous because of its functioning on ice could also be a useful tool to investigate
the bottom surface.19 Indeed, it was gross errors in radar altimetry that preceded radio-
glaciology. And, as we shall now see, it was interference with radar apparatus used in
ionospheric studies that accelerated its development.
Serendipity part II : the rewards of interference, 1958–63
In the late 1950s Antarctica was one of the main sites of observation for the study of
ionospheric phenomena such as the aurorae. It was by no means perfect, however.
Ionospheric research was at times jeopardized by mysterious interfering signals that
made it impossible continuously to record echoes from the ionosphere. After several
disappointing experiences, the British physicist Stanley Evans understood that the
pulses transmitted by ionosondes bounced on the Antarctic bottom surface, interfering
with radio echoes. Evans thus concluded that defective ionosondes could well be
transformed into tools for glaciological surveying.
In a similar way to radio engineering, radio-echo studies relied upon the use of
equipment produced during the Second World War. After the war, US and UK military
radar apparatus was lent to scientific groups for research on the ionosphere and astro-
nomical bodies. For example, in 1949 the model SCR 270 was used by a team at the
University of Saskatchewan in Canada to carry out studies on the aurora borealis.20 In
Britain, wartime radar designers such as the physicist Bernard Lovell deployed military
equipment in the study of meteors and satellites, effectively establishing the discipline of
radio astronomy.21
Radio-echo studies developed rapidly in Britain and the preparation for the IGY
provided a remarkable occasion to unite British research centres in common en-
deavours. The Royal Society of London, which took responsibility for IGY work in
Britain, funded new Antarctic projects. Three British research centres were recognized
as IGY data banks: the Balfour Stewart Aurora Laboratory of Edinburgh (for aurorae),
the SPRI (for glaciology) and the DSIR Radio Research Establishment (RRE) at Slough
(for other ionosphere phenomena).22
19 S. Evans, ‘Radio technique for the measurement of ice thickness’, Polar Record (1963), 11, 406–10.
20 P. A. Forsyth, W. Petrie, F. Vawter and B. W. Currie, ‘Radar reflexions from auroras’, Nature (1950),
4197, 561–2.
21 See D. Saward, Bernard Lovell : A Biography, London, 1984, especially Chapters 10 and 11; B. Lovell,
The Story of Jodrell Bank, London, 1968.
22 Special Committee on publications, 26 November 1957, in ‘IGY British National Committee–Minutes
and Papers’, IGY/4/1, Jodrell Bank Archive, John Rylands Library, University of Manchester (hereafter JBA).
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Lovell’s brainchild, the Jodrell Bank Observatory (JBO), was fully involved in the
Royal Society’s initiative and by the mid-1950s JBO personnel had already achieved an
excellent reputation in the development of radio-echo instrumentation. In 1955 Evans,
a young and promising physicist at Manchester University, was appointed lecturer in
radio astronomy at the JBO and in 1956 dispatched to the Royal Society’s base in
Antarctica at Halley Bay to study the aurora australis. During his fieldwork Evans used
an all-sky camera during the Antarctic night and an ionosonde to detect aurorae during
daylight, when they are invisible but still produce radio echoes. Evans’s work was
successful and duly reported in Britain as a major IGY achievement.23
Yet Evans’s research had been on the point of being completely unsatisfactory owing
to the interference of mysterious radio echoes.24 As JBO and RRE devices adopted
similar frequencies, Evans and Lovell at first believed that the main cause of interference
was their combined operation. The RRE investigator Walter Piggott was thus asked to
modify his apparatus. But disturbing signals continued to turn up in Antarctica. Piggott
was chiefly concerned with the fact that the ionograms – graphs showing detected
echoes in terms of frequency against range – had mysterious ‘gaps’ between continu-
ously recorded echoes.
Four years later these experimental errors became the subject of Evans’s research.
By then he had moved to the SPRI and continued to publish his earlier research on
aurorae.25 Evans had got to know Gordon de Quetteville Robin, the SPRI director,
through their mutual participation in the IGY. An Australian physicist who graduated
in Melbourne in 1939, Robin had moved to Britain after the war. Working at the
University of Birmingham under the guidance of Mark Oliphant, Robin established
himself as an expert in glaciological research. After a very brief period at the Australian
National University, in 1958 he was appointed director of the SPRI and in the same year
he invited Evans to work there with him.26
In 1960 Piggott visited Evans at the SPRI. By then the RRE researcher understood
that the ionograms showed ‘gaps’ only at very specific low frequencies. Together with
L. W. Barclay, Piggott also demonstrated that some signals were reflected at the inter-
face between the ice shelf and the sea beneath it. From this he inferred that their echoes
bounced back into the ionosphere and interfered with the signal produced by the
ionosondes. The following year Evans analysed ionograms recently produced at three
different stations in the Antarctic and found that they showed gaps in continuously
23 Evans’s achievements were reported in the British magazine Discovery, as he managed to produce
remarkable pictures of the aurora australis. A. Croome, ‘The IGY month by month’, Discovery, May 1957,
210.
24 Evans cabled Lovell that it was vital to the success of their programme that the interference problem be
solved. Stanley Evans to Bernard Lovell, 25 June 1956, cable R.S.86, in ‘IGY Minutes and Reports, Antarctic
Subcomittee’, IGY 3/1, JBA.
25 S. Evans and G. M. Thomas, ‘The southern auroral zone in Geomagnetic Longitude Sector 20E’,
Journal of Geophysical Research (1959), 64, 1381–8; S. Evans, ‘Horizontal movements of visual auroral
features’, Journal of Atmospheric and Terrestrial Physics (1959), 16, 190–2; idem, ‘Systematic movements of
aurorae at Halley Bay’, Proceedings of the Royal Society A (1960), 256, 234–40.
26 D. Drewry, ‘Gordon de Quetteville Robin: A Remembrance’, Polar Record (2005), 41, 177–81.
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recorded echoes from the layers E and F of the ionosphere at certain fixed low-power
frequencies (1 and 5 MHz). This confirmed Piggott’s findings (Figure 2).27
If Waite had initially been concerned with saving pilots’ lives, Evans was, at the
outset, primarily concerned with ionospheric research. He claimed that studying the
interaction of radio waves with ice had the purpose of alerting ‘ ionospheric workers’ to
the fact that they ‘should bear the presence [of echoes from the bottom surface] in mind
when analyzing results from polar stations’. That said, Evans did realize that interfering
radio waves may become valuable ‘for exploring the bottom topography’.28 His
analysis of the Antarctic ionograms led him to infer that a radio-echo apparatus
working at 30 to 35 MHz had potential for ice-sounding. Robin, who had encouraged
Evans’s investigation, now suggested designing new ice-sounding apparatus at the
SPRI. Funding for development of the instrument was made available through the
Royal Society.29
Figure 2. Sample ionogram from Ellsworth with layers and ‘mysterious gaps’ highlighted. From
S. Evans, ‘Polar ionospheric spread echoes and the radio frequency properties of ice shelves’,
Journal of Geophysical Research (1961), 66, 4137–41.
27 W. R. Piggott and L. W. Barclay, ‘The reflection of radio waves from an iceshelf’, Journal of
Atmospheric and Terrestrial Research (1961), 20, 298–9. ‘This was attributed to the effect of interference
between the waves radiated directly upwards from the aerials to that which is radiated downwards through
the ice and reflected from the bottom.’ Evans, op. cit. (19), 407.
28 S. Evans, ‘Polar ionospheric spread echoes and the radio frequency properties of ice shelves’, Journal of
Geophysical Research (1961), 66, 4137–41, 4141.
29 Evans, op. cit. (28), 4138. See also M. Mulkay, ‘Conceptual displacement and migration in science: a
prefatory paper’, Science Studies (1974), 4, 205–34, 218. Evans was awarded a grant from the Paul Instrument
Fund (PIF, established under the will of R. W. Paul, inventor of the ‘unipivot galvanometer’) and received
£2,736 in May 1962, £1,555 in October 1962 and £1,000 in September 1973 for the development of an
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By 1963 the new SPRI depth-sounderMark I was completed and tested at Halley Bay.
As in the case of the modified SCR 718, it was aimed at probing the ice. The reasons that
led its creator to consider applying radar devices to glaciology were likewise unexpec-
ted, the result of serendipitous discoveries taking place (as Evans noticed) ‘ in two quite
separate fields of study’ that had virtually nothing to do with glaciology.30 Even so, the
accidental nature of these discoveries could be fully appreciated only because the study
of experimental errors and accidents allowed envisaging different uses of existing ap-
paratus and its readaptation to glaciological research.
In the glaciologists’ hands: the development of RES, 1961–6
Whilst Evans and Waite were busy exploiting the defects of their devices, major
political changes were occurring that altered significantly Antarctica’s geopolitical
circumstances. The success of scientific projects in Antarctica during the IGY paved the
way for the establishment of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR).
SCAR was established in October 1958 as a ‘Special ’ (later ‘Scientific’) Committee
of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). SCAR was an international
organization devoted solely to the promotion, planning and coordination of research in
the Antarctic. Twelve countries (the USA, the UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, the
USSR, Argentina, Chile, Belgium, Japan, Norway and South Africa) made contribu-
tions to its initial budget.31 In 1959 the countries operating SCAR signed the Antarctic
Treaty (AT), which came into force on 23 June 1961. The treaty was an agreement to set
Antarctica aside for peaceful purposes and particularly for science, while all claims to
portions of Antarctic territory were forestalled.32 This helped defuse tensions between
signatory members, especially with regard to those nations whose claims to Antarctic
territory overlapped (notably Argentina, Chile and Britain). It also helped each super-
power (the USSR were newcomers to Antarctica) to prevent the other making ex-
clusive claims on portions of Antarctic territory. Moreover, the treaty established the
principle at the height of the Cold War that in Antarctica there would be no military or
nuclear installations on the continent and that each country could perform inspections
on another country’s bases. Yet military forces continued to play a major role in
Antarctic affairs and to have a significant presence on the continent, especially as a
echo-sounder for ice-thickness measurements. ‘PIF Grants’, MS 840/1, Royal Society Archives, London.
Michael (‘Mike’) E. R. Walford assisted Evans in the construction of the instrument.
30 Evans, op. cit. (19), 406.
31 Within SCAR, eight working groups were also set up: Biology, Geodesy and Cartography, Geology,
Glaciology, Human Biology andMedicine, Logistics, Solid Earth Geophysics, Upper Atmosphere Physics. See
Fifield, op. cit. (2), 5.
32 The twelve signatory members, ‘Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that
Antarctica shall continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes … and Acknowledging the
substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international cooperation in scientific
investigation … Agreed that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only … (Article 1) and that
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied during the
International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty (Article 2). ’ The
Antarctic Treaty, 1959. (The whole treaty is available at http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/About_Antarctica/
Treaty/treaty.html.)
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logistical aid to international collaboration between research groups. As Fae Korsmo
has argued, after the IGY ‘the interests of scientists and national security coexisted in
alignment and mutual support’.33 Moreover, full AT membership was only granted to
those states able to invest substantially in scientific research, which usually meant the
ability to establish and maintain a scientific research station in Antarctica. The SCAR
(now a ‘Scientific’ committee) was given the function of the AT’s chief science advisory
body in Antarctica’s novel system of governance. SCAR became a platform for the
coordination of scientific research and so acquired new diplomatic significance.34 This
arrangement effectively allowed scientists with common research interests to organize
new investigations, which in the light of the treaty gained a geopolitical emphasis.
Glaciologists who had spent time in the Antarctic as explorers had a prominent role in
the organization of SCAR. Robin achieved positions of responsibility within the or-
ganization, as UK delegate from 1958 and as SCAR executive secretary from 1959. At
the fourth SCAR annual meeting, held in Cambridge in 1960, the British delegation was
represented by Robin and assisted by Evans as adviser. In the same period the US SCAR
delegation was also composed of glaciologists who had now become science adminis-
trators. Amongst others was Albert ‘Bert ’ Paddock Crary (known to Robin because of
their mutual research activities in the poles), one of the US advisers during these meet-
ings and the secretary of the SCAR working group on logistics.35 Crary was the first
person to have reached both poles and played a leading role in the organization of the
IGY in Antarctica, managing US traverses across the Ross Ice Shelf. In 1961 he was
appointed chief scientist of the US Antarctic research programme and codirector of the
newly established NSF Office of Antarctic Programs (OAP), which also greatly ex-
tended his influence.
The positions that Crary and Robin came to occupy allowed them to promote new
means of glaciological exploration. Robin in particular had pioneered techniques of ice-
sounding based on seismic reflection and gravity measurements during the
Norwegian–British–Swedish Antarctic Expedition of 1949–52. Seismic reflection in-
volved exploding charges of dynamite in ice holes and, with the help of geophones
(miniature seismographs), gathering data on the ice depth. The idea of mapping
Antarctica’s sub-glacial morphology had motivated Crary’s research since its inception,
also leading to a plan to exploit traverses to prepare a ‘plastic relief map’ of the
continent.36 Both Robin and Crary were aware, however, that traditional techniques
of sounding were inadequate for far-reaching projects such as the detailed mapping of
33 F. Korsmo, ‘Science in the Cold War: the legacy of the IGY’, NSF Special Scientific Report 98–07, 7
April 1998. See also F. Korsmo and M. P. Sfraga, ‘From interwar to Cold War: selling field science in the
United States, 1920s through 1950s’, Earth Sciences History (2003), 22, 55–78.
34 A. Elzinga, ‘The interplay of research and politics: the case of Antarctica’, in Society and the
Environment: A Swedish Research Perspective (ed. U. Sverdin and B. H. Anisansson), Dordrecht, 1992,
257–83. See also K. Dodds, Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim, New York,
1997.
35 ‘SCAR Bulletin. 4th meeting, Cambridge, 29.8/2.9.1960’, Polar Record (1960), 10, 416.
36 H. K. Bourne (UK scientific observer in Antarctica), ‘SomeNotes on Polar Research’, undated (but early
1960s) in AD3/1/AS/131/1 (2) Part 2, BAS Archives, Cambridge (hereafter BAS). On the origins of seismic
reflection see C. C. Bates, T. F. Gaskell and R. B. Rice, Geophysics in the Affairs of Man, Oxford, 1982.
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sub-glacial Antarctica. A major drawback was that their deployment in large territories
was costly and of limited accuracy. Moreover, traditional probing tools could not
provide continuous profiling.
RES gave Crary and Robin the opportunity to determine whether the limits of
traditional techniques could be overcome. Crary was aware of Waite’s research and in
1962 proposed that the radio engineer attend the SCAR annual meeting. The initiative
led to the organization of an international experiment to ‘quickly evaluate each
[glaciological surveying] system regarding its accuracy, speed and cost per mile of
survey’.37 It was for this reason that it was suggested to Robin as SCAR executive
secretary that the Thule military base in Greenland be used as a site to test the most
advanced systems of glaciological sounding. Thanks to an intervention by Waite the US
Army welcomed the proposal of an international experiment promoted as an exercise
in international collaboration.38 In that respect the experiment was consistent with a
vision embodied in post-IGY US science policy. As shown by Ronald Doel and Allan
Needell, US science administrators such as Lloyd Berkner believed there was little
contradiction between international exchange of scientific data and close collaboration
with US military branches. In fact the collaboration carried added propaganda value by
showing the triumph of science over politics. And it could, more pragmatically, help US
researchers gather a deeper understanding of ways to develop frontier research.39 Of
course, the new policy was always balanced between scientific gains and security risks.
It is notable, for instance, that no Russian was invited to attend the ‘ international
experiment’.
The tests were carried out in April 1963 and compared seismic, gravity, radio echo-
sounding and electrical resistance methods. Waite’s modified SCR 718 (at 110, 220 and
440 MHz) and Evans’s SPRI Mark I (at 30 and 35 MHz) were both tested. Most seismic
and gravity measurements were conducted with equipment provided by Charles
Bentley, of the Geophysical and Polar Research Centre (GPRC), University of
Wisconsin, in the US. Bentley’s expertise in the field was by then well known, as he had
also participated in the seismic traverses of the IGY and was the US representative of the
SCAR working group on glaciology.
The ‘ international experiment ’ produced mixed results but showed a communal in-
terest in further exploration of the potential of RES.40 During the following Antarctic
37 A. Waite, ‘The International Cooperative Experiment on Glacial Sounding, sponsored by USAEL and
USACRREL, Greenland 1963 and 1964’, paper presented at the Glacier Mapping Symposium, Canadian
National Research Council, Ottawa, 15 September 1965.
38 The headquarters of the US Army Electronics Research and Development Laboratory were based
in Thule, a US Air Force base and a vital and heavily militarized centre in North America’s first line of defence
in the Arctic. C. Swithinbank, Forty Years on Ice: A Lifetime of Exploration and Research in the Polar
Regions, Sussex, 1998, 79.
39 R. Doel and A. A. Needell, ‘Science, scientists and the CIA: balancing international ideals, national
needs and professional opportunities’, in Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA (ed. R. Jeffreys-Jones and
C. Andrews), London, 1997, 59–81.
40 Waite claimed that the radar altimeters and radio-echo equipment ‘worked successfully’. Evans, how-
ever, claimed that the apparatus had worked efficiently but was not powerful enough. S. Evans, ‘International
cooperative field experiment in glacier sounding’, Polar Record (1963), 11, 725–6. According to an anony-
mous reviewer, ‘Waite failed to obtain good results with his high-frequency altimeter, he obtained virtually
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summer, Evans’s assistant, Mike Walford, took the SPRI Mark I to Halley Bay to
develop the first test of its accuracy in glacier measurements.41 In the meantime Evans
decided to work on an improved version of the echo-sounder equipped with an imaging
device that continuously recorded on film the pulse traces as pictured on an oscillo-
scope, a device used to trace electronic signals that are fed into cathode ray tubes. The
SPRI Mark II was tested in Thule, Greenland, in June and July 1964, when a new phase
of the international experiment was set up. This time the echo-sounders proved
more efficient and successfully recorded depths of 1,500 meters. Even Evans became
convinced after these trials that RES was a viable technology for the task at hand.42
Various types of echo-sounder were all deployed in Antarctica experimentally from
the mid-1960s. Waite’s apparatus was loaned to the GPRC’s personnel for use in the
context of NSF-funded research activities taking place during US traverses. In 1966,
following the Greenland experiments, the SPRI Mark II was tested in the air. It was first
used at Ellesmere Island, Canada, in a joint mission organized by SPRI with the
Canadian Defence Research Board. The team flew an Otter aircraft over the island and
recorded very satisfactory RES data. Afterwards the apparatus was loaned to Charles
Swithinbank of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS), who brought it to Halley Bay
and, together with David Petrie, flew it on the Swiss-built Porter ‘Pilatus ’.43 If several
groups could now deploy RES in polar projects this was by and large because of the
international experiment, itself an offspring of the SCAR and AT initiatives.
Despite accidents,44 by 1966 RES had reached a stage in its development that allowed
consideration of its deployment in large-scale research projects aimed at exploring
Antarctica’s sub-glacial morphology. Its technical features had proved it more efficient
than traditional techniques of sounding on land and fostered its experimental use
in airborne surveying. Moreover, the new geopolitical circumstances outlined by the
AT had given Crary, the OAP chief scientist, the opportunity to reconsider his attempt
to map sub-glacial Antarctica. Under his guidance the OAP was now planning to
establish an ‘airborne laboratory’, including a number of remote sensing and
reconnaissance devices (echo-sounders, radar altimeters, aerial photographic instru-
ments, infrared sensors and magnetometers) for the purpose of providing basic
continuous echoes’. Anon., ‘RES’, Ice (1962), 16, 10–12. Finally, Bentley claimed that the ‘30 MHz system
did better than Bud’s [Waite] 440 MHz system, because I remember there was a frequency factor … 440 was,
it was just too high frequency … Stan’s system failed before we got very deep, but still it was, it proved that the
system had worked, and then it was just a matter of continuing development. ’ Interview with Professor
Emeritus C. Bentley at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA, 6 October 2005.
41 M. E. R. Walford, ‘RES through an ice shelf’, Nature (1964), 204, 317–19.
42 Evans wrote, ‘these operations represented the biggest leap forward in technique and analysis so far’.
They especially helped to consider the greater accuracy provided by RES systems with respect to seismic
sounding. S. Evans, ‘Progress Report on RES’, Polar Record (1967), 13, 413–20, 414. It is worth noting that
the use of visual feedback made RES similar to marine echo-sounding, even though the latter is based on
acoustic – rather than electromagnetic – means of remote sensing.
43 Swithinbank, op. cit. (38), 36.
44 In October 1965 one of Evans’s assistants, J. T. Bailey, died in a crevasse whilst surveying a large
unknown sector from Halley Bay to the Weddell Sea. He and two attendants, D. Wild and J. Wilson, lost their
lives 250 miles from the base. His mission logbook is at the SPRI. See ‘Bailey’s logbooks, 1965’,
T. H. Manning Archive, SPRI, University of Cambridge (hereafter THMA).
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geological and glaciological data on the whole continent.45 Whilst NSF funding for
traditional traverse work began to be constrained, that available for airborne RES was
increased.46
These developments also followed an analysis of what the Soviet Union was doing in
this field, as forms of scientific competition (aside from collaboration) set in. By the
mid-1960s the USSR had invested only half of what the US had spent in Antarctica.
Nonetheless, Soviet traverses had allowed Russian scientists to gain a good under-
standing of its glaciological structure, as well as to develop new technologies. From
1964 they had developed RES instrumentation using a frequency of 211 MHz at the
Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute in Leningrad. Although the instrument
was successfully deployed to map Eastern Antarctica during the Ninth Soviet Antarctic
Expedition (1965–6), at the beginning it was not airborne and it did not make use of
continuous film recording. The advantages and limitations of Soviet RES technologies
were well known and they certainly instigated a scientific race to deploy a new sur-
veying method based on airborne radio echoes.47
Despite the success of the international experiment the NSF did not immediately look
at the SPRI as a viable partner for RES-surveying Antarctica. The NSF chief candidate
was Waite’s organization, the US Army Electronic Laboratories (USAEL, ex-US SCR).
A ‘preliminary forecast ’ on US Antarctic research activities for the 1966–7 season
indicated that the USAEL was going to work under a ‘programme of ice thickness
measurements ’ as part of the airborne-laboratory project. The NSF allocated funding
and the US Navy squadron VX-6 made one of its aircraft available.48 Aside from
advantaging US glaciological groups, there may have been technical reasons that
convinced the NSF administrators to favour a partnership with the USAEL. The
film-recording technique used by Evans appeared to US experts too cumbersome, not
to mention impractical. Bentley’s assistant George Jiracek had been unimpressed
by Evans’s equipment, on which he reported negatively after the 1964 international
experiment. The GPRC and USAEL staff preferred techniques to reduce data to
numbers, later computerized.49 Waite’s equipment never developed a visual monitoring
45 Detailed description of the plan is in Appendix I – Airborne Laboratory, 44–6 of ‘Plans for U.S. Science
Activities in Antarctica, 1968–1972 (Five Year projection)’, 1 June 1968, in ‘Budget’, Box 1, NSF 307/32, US
National Archives and Record Administration, Washington, DC (hereafter NARA).
46 In 1965 the OAP codirector, T. O. Jones, wrote to Crary about Bentley’s programme, stating that ‘ I am
assuming that we can avoid a traverse in the 1966–67 summer. Bentley has talked about a small Pole to
Ellsworth Mountain traverse, but because of the possibilities of an air-borne radio-sounder, I would rather
not operate the traverse at least for a number of years’. T. O. Jones to A. P. Crary, 30 August 1965, in
‘Budget’, Box 1, NSF 307/32, NARA.
47 As the note ‘Soviet Antartic maps’, Polar Records (1961), 10, 528, shows, mapping activities of Soviet
parties had been monitored since the late 1950s. Evans had been especially interested in Russian advancement
in radio-glaciology and visited Leningrad in 1966. Evans, op. cit. (19), 413–20; idem, ‘Fale radiowe w bada-
niach glacjologicznych’, Prezglad. Geofizyczny (1967), 12, 383–400. On Soviet maps see V. G. Bakaev, Atlas
of Antarctica, Moscow, 1966.
48 A sum of $30,000 had been already allocated for this plan. T. O. Jones to A. P. Crary, 30 August 1965,
and ‘Preliminary forecast of 1966–7 U.S. Antarctic Research Program Activities (Prepared for the Naval
Support Force, Antarctica Conference)’, 9 August 1965, in ‘Budget’, Box 1, NSF 307/32, NARA.
49 Jiracek reported that ‘Evans puts a lot of emphasis on the need for a video amplifier prior to the intensity
modulation. I’m sure his emphasis is well founded but I’m not clear as to what his reasons are, therefore not
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technology. Jiracek’s criticism shows the existence of different experimental cultures
that defined different avenues in the development of RES.50 Evans clearly saw imaging
as an essential addition to RES that could offer a better understanding of Antarctica’s
glaciological features, in contrast with Jiracek and Waite, who believed that a quanti-
tative understanding would suffice for the task.51
At some point during 1966 Crary sought to align the RES project with Robin’s
institution rather than with USAEL.52 The reasons for reversing decisions taken the
previous year remain unknown, but presumably derived from an evaluation of scien-
tific, political and administrative gains associated with establishing an NSF–SPRI
partnership. Crary had always sympathetically viewed Robin’s effort to contribute
to the development of radio-glaciology at the SPRI. For example, as trustee of the
Ford Foundation he had been instrumental in helping the SPRI director get funding for
the construction of a new building including an electrical laboratory. In 1965 the
foundation awarded $280,000 for the project.53 The 1966 airborne RES tests may have
convinced Crary that Evans’s device had greater potential than Waite’s. The much-
criticized photographic technique used in Evans’s device allowed Swithinbank to
visualize the sub-glacial morphology of the Antarctic Peninsula and offered a wealth of
data on bedrock structure and ice layering.54 Moreover, the collaboration with the SPRI
would align the OAP’s activities with post-IGY science policy in the US, fostering in-
ternational collaboration alongside national scientific endeavours.
The proposed NSF–SPRI collaboration did not entail a provision of funding for the
SPRI personnel, in contrast with the USAEL’s proposal, but would only lead to the
provision of free hours of flight and transport to SPRI personnel to carry out surveys in
Antarctica in coordination with the US Navy’s VX-6. This is not to say that Crary was
necessarily worried about money as such. Rather, the partnership allowed him to make
better and more rational use of NSF resources. In turn, Crary’s plans strengthened those
of Robin to gather British funding for the deployment of RES. The opportunity to
collaborate with the NSF helped Robin to gather additional resources for the initiative
convinced of its importance … Also I feel that recording is tedious, of questionable accuracy, and very time
consuming’. G. R. Jiracek, ‘RF equipment considerations’, 17 August 1964, in ‘Experiments in radio
sounding of Polar ice thickness’, Paper 86–5355, copy in C. Bentley’s Papers at the Byrd Polar Research
Center, The Ohio State University Archives.
50 For a technical analysis of the differences between the RES systems see L. A. Plewes and B. Hubbard,
‘A review of the use of radio-echo sounding in glaciology’, Progress in Physical Geography (2001), 25, 2,
203–36, 209.
51 It seems to us the real issue was not one of technological superiority, but rather one of traditions
or ‘material cultures’ in instrument- and experiment-making. One may even draw on P. Galison’s notions of
‘ image’ (Evans) and ‘logic’ (Waite, Jiracek) to explain it. P. Galison, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of
Microphysics, Chicago, 1997.
52 A. Crary to G. Robin, 12 January 1967, in ‘Glaciology ice sounding by radio techniques (Dr. Evans),
1962–1972’, AD3/1/AS/139 (3), BAS. Drewry, op. cit. (26), 179, seems to suggest that this followed Robin’s
initiative.
53 See ‘Foreword’, Polar Record (1965), 12, 681. The operating budget of the foundation for supporting
research worldwide was in the range of twenty million dollars. On the funding activities of the Ford
Foundation see Krige, op. cit. (7), 172–3.
54 On returning to Britain in February 1967 Swithinbank had shown Crary the preliminary results of his
Antarctica RES flights, which had excited the latter. Swithinbank, op. cit. (38), 40.
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through the British Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC), which in 1967
awarded the SPRI £65,000 over the following three years.55
On the whole, the collaboration between the NSF and the SPRI materialized Crary’s
and Robin’s early prospects of mapping the glaciological structures of the entire
continent. Plans would be put forward at the NSF to make sure that the whole of
Antarctica could be mapped (Figure 3). Big science in radio-glaciology was about to
begin.
Synchronicity : the Antarctic missions, 1967–79
From 1967 to 1979 much of the Antarctic bottom topography was revealed through
the deployment of RES in the context of the collaborative SPRI–NSF project.56 Later,
another organization, the Elektromagnetisk Institut of the Technical University of
Denmark (TUD), became involved. Robin, with Evans, led most of the missions,
although from the 1974–5 season leadership passed to the SPRI senior scientist David
Drewry. Educated at the University of Cambridge, Drewry had participated in the
development of RES since the Greenland experiment. His experience and knowledge of
RES allowed him to lead the missions to completion with the publication of the
Antarctic glaciological maps mentioned at the start of this paper.
Over the course of twelve years there were many changes in the scope and func-
tioning of the project. From 1970 Crary was no longer the OAP director. In the same
year the NSF bureau became the Office of Polar Programmes (OPP), in an attempt to
place equal emphasis on fundamental research in the Arctic as well as the Antarctic.
The restructuring process also affected the NSF–SPRI project, which had to conform to
the new OPP agenda. Its new director, Philip M. Smith, indicated the need for the OPP
to focus on big-science projects with an international character, thereby moving beyond
the traditional institutional setting defined by SCAR.57 In May 1969 the US, the USSR,
Australia and France joined in a new International Antarctic Glaciological Programme
(IAGP) aimed at exploring East Antarctica. The RES project became an integral part
of IAGP and concentrated on sounding that vast territory during the second and,
especially, the third missions. The setting up of IAGP and its use in connection with the
NSF–SPRI project showed that the institutional landscape of international collabor-
ation in radio-glaciology had changed over the years, adapting to new interests and
agendas.58
But these changes did not significantly affect the research modus operandi during the
missions. The deployment of RES relied upon the capacity of glaciologists to interact
with experts from other fields and use other technologies as aids during missions. Flight
planning relied upon radio-transmitted satellite pictures of meteorological systems,
55 NERC continued funding the SPRI in relation to the joint initiative for the following thirteen years.
56 The first mission in 1967–8 also included the BAS.
57 Smith to Robin, 25 March 1970, in ‘UK 1970’, Box 31, NSF 307/64, NARA.
58 Smith argued that aside from political concerns, there were also financial concerns for the new strategy
of funding, as the new US science policy tried to cut down on the number of organizations requiring financial
assistance to keep them running. Smith to Robin, 7 May 1970, in ‘UK 1970’, Box 31, NSF 307/64, NARA.
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flight operations depended on the aircraft’s technology, and the performance of
radar sounding could be checked only through imaging facilities used to picture pulses
(Figure 4). Rigorous planning, synchronization and coordination were thus essential.
Errors and accidents, which had been so valuable in the origins of RES, were now
reduced and, as much as was possible, eliminated.
Figure 3.Mapping Antarctica. The flight lines originally planned at the NSF. From ‘NSF Plans for
US science activities in Antarctica, 1968–1972’, Box 32, 307, NARA, Washington, DC.
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Before each mission the SPRI and the US Navy would debate what portion of the
Antarctic continent they would cover, with negotiations often lasting several months.
SPRI crews would then be flown from Washington, DC to Christchurch airport in
New Zealand and from there to the US Antarctic base of McMurdo Sound. Missions
changed considerably from one season to another and became far more complex than
was initially foreseen.59 Even before flying across Antarctica the RES personnel relied
on a number of technologies to analyse weather conditions. Plans could be changed at
any time if meteorological observations indicated the impossibility of flying over certain
areas due to poor weather.60 Data were gathered from satellite photography using the
NIMBUS and ESSA satellite systems. The pictures were analysed daily, demonstrating
the importance of efficient radio communications as they allowed the transference of
photographic data to McMurdo.
Figure 4. RES and the ‘airborne laboratory’, 1967–79.
59 In interviewDrewry agreed that it was a sort of ‘military campaign’ : ‘The optimal situation was to have
two flight crews in operation in order to have maximum flying time.When one crew came in another would be
ready to go out. They would have the program planned two or three flights ahead. But they couldn’t go
beyond that due to changing conditions and requirements. They would try to get the flight crews to compete
with each other in order to cover the most territory. They explained to the Navy personnel what they were
trying to do and tried to recruit them to the cause of polar exploration, get them involved so they would get
the best outcome for the flight campaign. All sorts of information had to be coordinated in the planning
room.’ Interview with Professor David Drewry at the University of Hull, UK, 6 April 2004.
60 Although the RES system would work efficiently regardless of these conditions, the navigation appar-
atus of the aircraft was more likely to be affected. S. Evans, D. Drewry and G. Robin, ‘RES in Antarctica,
1971–1972’, Polar Record (1972), 16, 207–12.
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RES apparatus epitomized the integration of radio engineering and imaging
technologies. Echo detection was obtained through sweeping the frequency band as
well as signal attenuation and amplification. The possibility of changing the frequency
or attenuating the signal came from the operator, who could monitor radar per-
formance thanks to an oscilloscope. Meanwhile, another oscilloscope attached to a
camera was used to record on film the electronic image of probed areas. The perform-
ance of radar, oscilloscopes and film cameras was to be coordinated to ensure that the
radar worked effectively and that it produced valuable records of the bottom topogra-
phy.61
The need for greater integration marked the transition from the first airborne
RES apparatus, the SPRI Mark II, used during the first mission, to the second, the
Mark IV. The new apparatus was designed to allow ‘automatic annotation of records
with the received gain information, also using plug-in modules for rapid servicing
in field operation’.62 It had a new panel allowing immediate control over sweeping
operations and camera speed. The SPRI Mark IV was replaced from 1974–5 by a
new radar apparatus designed by the TUD, which worked at 60 MHz as well as
300 MHz. The Danish system used a new design that allowed operation at higher
frequencies and ensured a greater definition of the bottom layers as well as ice-
sheet structure. Its introduction in the design of the new RES system was due to
the technical expertise of the Danish radio engineer Peter Gudmansen, of the TUD’s
Elektromagnetisk Institut.
The beginning of the collaboration with the Danish party, which from the third
mission was made responsible for antenna design and from the fourth for RES
apparatus, was instigated by the NSF because of several factors. Gudmansen had
been responsible for the organization of the first International Meeting on Radio-
Glaciology at Lyngby in 1970. This had proved an important occasion to share
ideas with key players in the development of different radio sounding systems in use.63
In contrast with Evans, Gudmansen was convinced that a sounder using pulse am-
plification granted greater success in profiling ice sheets, and in 1973 with NSF
financial support he had tested a new system of this kind in Greenland. While planning
the fourth mission the NSF administrators emphasized that sounding work should
61 This coordination was so good that it has preserved the usability of the data to the present. The fact that
so much data was recorded in a robust format that withstood the subsequent digital revolution in scientific
technologies means that it can still be used for glaciological purposes (even though the navigational errors are
far greater than would now occur). Furthermore, with modern digital processing techniques, the analogue
data can be processed and scrutinized as if they were new data. Thus the data have acquired a usefulness that
was almost certainly not originally envisaged.
62 S. Evans and B. M. E. Smith, ‘A radio echo equipment for depth sounding in polar ice sheets’, Journal of
Physics E: Scientific Instruments (1969), 2, 131–6. The Mark III model was never used during the SPRI–NSF
missions because it was conceived for small-scale work, possibly of commercial type, on temperate glaciers.
63 See, amongst others, V. V. Bogorodskij, G. V. Trepov and B. A. Federov, On measuring dielectric
properties of glaciers in the field in Proceedings of the International Meeting on Radioglaciology
(ed. P. Gudmansen), Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby (Denmark), May 1970, 20–31; P. Gudmansen,
‘Notes on radar sounding of the Greenland peninsula’, in ibid., 124–33; and S. Evans, ‘Review of the radio
echo system performance in Gudmansen, P. E. ’, in ibid., 100–2. For a technical analysis of the differences
between the various RES systems see Plewes and Hubbard, op. cit. (50), 210–11.
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concentrate on West Antarctica to assist drilling plans in the proximity of the US base
Siple.64 Yet the SPRI team was against this solution: because of warm, thick ice the area
was difficult to sound. It was then that NSF administrators suggested using
Gudmansen’s apparatus because it had proved very successful on the Greenland ice
sheet, which presented similar problems.65 The SPRI team was initially resistant to this
solution but the TUD’s radar proved successful and they agreed on using it during the
following missions. These technical issues may have also overlapped with other geo-
political concerns. The role of Denmark as a founding NATOmember with sovereignty
over Greenland, a key strategic territory in the US line of defence, may have instigated
collaboration between the NSF and Danish scientific parties, first in the Arctic, then in
the Antarctic.66
Oscilloscopes and cameras were essential to radar operations. During later missions
they were used in combination with other visual and recording technologies that
enhanced accuracy and visual rendering. Their use in RES operations was greatly
beneficial because it allowed electronic imaging of the bottom topography. In the 1960s
the leading company in oscilloscope manufacturing was the US firm Tektronix. Its
cofounders Howard Vollum and Jack Murdock had pioneered the sector by inventing
the first triggered oscilloscope in 1946.67 Its chief innovation was that it allowed the
display of single pulses, which greatly enhanced RES operations. Moreover, the 321
model was advertised as ‘for the travelling engineer ’. Its weight, only nine kilograms,
made it especially valuable for airborne sounding.68 The technique of attaching film
cameras to oscilloscopes was not new. The firmD. Shackman& Sons, based in Chesham
in Buckinghamshire, had by then become popular as a producer of oscilloscope cameras
such as the AC 2/25 model. It mounted a 35 mm film, which presented the oscilloscope
output. The off-the-shelf camera was modified for continuous slow advance, and its
advance speed could also be controlled through the SPRI Mark IV panel.
The very act of using radar apparatus during missions regimented operations.
Even before the first mission Evans realized that the coordination of detection techni-
ques and visual technologies was extremely important to the ultimate success of
sounding operations.69 In the early years of RES, echo detection was intermittent
64 ‘Proposed SPRI/NSF RES Operations in Antarctica, Spring 1973’, ‘SPRI-Ice thickness’, Box 30, NSF
307/64, NARA.
65 R. Zwally’s note, 5 June 1973, in ‘SPRI-Ice thickness ’, Box 30, NSF 307/64, NARA.
66 Thanks to one of the anonymous referees for highlighting this issue to us.
67 Marshall M. Lee, Winning with People: The First 40 Years of Tektronix, Beaverton, 1986.
68 Monitoring considerations dictated that Evans adopt a pulse radar system rather than a frequency-
modulated one: ‘A pulse radar system was chosen mainly for this reason, because the monitor output is
immediately interpretable, whereas a frequency-modulated system would require a bulky multi-channel
analyzer to present complicated output information in a similar form’. Evans and Smith, op. cit. (62), 135.
69 Evans’s previous work in ionosphere research also played a role in this realization: ‘We then realized
that these ideas which had been developed generally in radar, and in my particular case the meteors, and a lot
of ionospheric analysis – they could just be lifted straight in. It was very easy …We have drawn a terrific lot of
analogies, a lot of results from ionospheric work; fading patterns, movement, reflections from rough surfaces,
propagation through irregular media, it is all very closely related to the ionospheric thing.’ Mulkay, op. cit.
(29), 219.
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and erratic.70 Fading patterns, scattering effects, noise and interference compromised
detection and it took several years to make the technique reliable. Recording operations
on camera film would start only when system performance was optimized. Improving
performance meant finding the ‘echo strengths’, the points in which the signal-to-noise
ratio (measured in decibels) of echoes allowed satisfactory detection. The operator
would thus record in logbooks sweeping operations in an attempt to hit upon these
echo strengths. Only at that point would the camera shutter be open to produce RES
films.71
With its speed synchronization and signal control, the entire system needed
calibration. For this purpose each mission would start with some trial flights at
New Zealand’s Christchurch airport to find out what signal attenuation would be ideal
in registering echo strengths. During trial flights the apparatus was tested for this
purpose on a horizontal smooth reflector (calm sea or thin sea ice). From the fifth
mission new instrumentation perfected this coordination. A fibre-optic recording
oscillograph was produced by Honeywell, which allowed the printing of oscilloscope
images during flights, whereas a new apparatus for the measurement of echo strengths
was designed at the SPRI.72
The airborne laboratory
Aircraft were a major technological feature of each mission, affecting decision-making
on weight of equipment, overall electric power, range, navigation and installations. The
US Navy Squadron VX-6 provided SPRI personnel with the aircraft already deployed
for transport of supplies. A Lockheed C121 Super Constellation was used during the
first mission. This was a modified version of the commercial Constellation adapted to
military duties by the US Navy. The C121 had a range of 3,380 kilometres, stretched for
the RES mission to 3,800 kilometres by installing a special fuel bladder in the passenger
cabin.73 From the second mission the US Navy made available one of its Lockheed
C130s, which ensured greater reliability. In 1960 VX-6 had equipped its air fleet with six
new Hercules C130 Fs, which became the chief aircraft for heavy transport deployment
in Antarctica, also allowing short take-offs and landings. Model F was faster than the
C121, allowing cruising at 355 miles per hour, and had virtually the same range as a
70 This is shown in the logbooks of the Greenland experiment. For example: 24 June 1964, ‘bottom echoes
obscured by scatter. Watch abandoned’; ‘echo begins to merge … no echo observed’. 28 June 1964,
‘Complicated shallow region, very shallow echoes’. Similar remarks continued to appear in late logbooks and
during all SPRI–NSF missions. See Greenland Logbooks, 1964, THMA.
71 The operator would record on logbook ‘OS-open shutter’ ; ‘CS-close shutter’. Logbooks of earlier
operations show records of signal attenuation (expressed in dB) as well as pulse rate (in ms). Interestingly, the
pulse rate would also be expressed in div. (divisions per second), showing again the importance of visual
feedback from the oscilloscope. Division is each square of the lattice’s graticule that appears on the oscillo-
scope. See Greenland experiments logbooks, 1964, and Ellesmere Island logbooks, 1966, THMA.
72 This also ‘gave an invaluable boost to the enthusiasm of both aircrew and scientists, as well as providing
data of the highest quality’. D. J. Drewry and D. T. Meldrum, ‘Antarctic airborne radio echo sounding,
1977–1978’, Polar Record (1978), 19, 267–73. On the echo-strength apparatus see C. S. Neal, ‘Radio-echo
power profiling’, Journal of Glaciology (1976), 17, 527–30.
73 Anon., ‘Radio echo exploration of the Antarctic ice sheet’, Polar Record (1967), 14, 211–13.
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modified C121. Most missions demonstrated the advantages offered by the C130 F in
terms of greater number of hours flown. In the last two missions a new model, the C130
R, was introduced. This had an even greater range because of its under-wing external
fuel tanks.74
Navigation technologies were also a crucial feature of these missions as it was
essential that SPRI personnel knew the position of the aircraft during the whole flight
in order to make valuable use of RES data. Just before the 1960s aircraft
navigation technologies moved from dead reckoning to inertial navigation.75
Dead reckoning, used during the first two missions, was far from accurate and
margins of error of between thirty and thirty-five kilometres were not uncommon,
a major problem since Robin intended to produce a hundred-kilometre grid map
survey of Antarctica.76 The SPRI personnel tried reducing these margins by using
additional positional data through trimetrogon photography, which enabled their
reduction to ten kilometres.77 Nonetheless, positional errors continued to affect sur-
veying.
After the 1971–2 season, two Litton LTN-51 devices for inertial guidance were in-
stalled on the aircraft. Inertial navigation enabled the calculation of the position of the
aircraft by measuring its linear and angular accelerations, all thanks to gyrocompasses.
Inertial guidance had been developed chiefly for intercontinental and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles. But a number of American companies, including Litton,
Honeywell, Sperry Rand, Autonetics and AC Delco, competed to pioneer the new
technology, knowing its potential for the aircraft navigation market.78 Not only did the
application of inertial guidance to RES missions greatly reduce the margin of error in
positioning, now in the order of five kilometres (and usually between two and three
kilometres), it also allowed for a complete change in mission planning and execution.
Before and during the 1971–2 season, aircraft had to follow flight lines derived from
McMurdo and another Antarctic base. The introduction of inertial navigation allowed
the definition of flight lines according to grid patterns, regardless of arrival and depar-
ture points (Figure 5).79
74 Description of the new C130 for Antarctic exploration is given in ‘Use of jet-prop aircraft at US
Antarctic stations, 1960’, Polar Record (1960), 10, 298. On performance during missions see Drewry and
Meldrum, op. cit. (72), 268.
75 In dead reckoning navigation the aircraft position is estimated considering course (direction of travel),
speed and distance of the aircraft at a certain moment in time during travel.
76 G. Robin, D. Drewry and D. Meldrum, ‘International studies of ice sheet and bedrock’, Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London (1977), 279, 185–96.
77 D. Drewry, ‘RES map of Antarctica’, Polar Record (1975), 17, 359–60. This was obtained through the
use of three cameras placed on the same frame, but at different angles. The SPRI archive still has cameras that
were very probably used during these missions, one a large Zeiss Ikon camera made in Germany, the other the
K20 model produced by the Fomer Graflex Corp for the US Air Force, normally used in reconnaissance
operations. On the importance of photogrammetry see Cloud, op. cit. (8), 263.
78 Litton was a start-up company that ‘played a major part in the development … and became AC Delco’s
original main competitor in the civil air market’. D. Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology
of Nuclear Missile Guidance, Cambridge, MA, 1990, 174.
79 Drewry, op. cit. (77).
438 Simone Turchetti, Katrina Dean, Simon Naylor and Martin Siegert
Navigational data were so essential to airborne missions that the SPRI crew
had to develop a way of making them immediately accessible.80 When in 1966 the
Mark II apparatus was flown first at Ellesmere Island then on the Antarctic Peninsula,
the correlation of positional and ice-thickness data was ensured by using flight
recorders of the SFIM type.81 Flight recorders (or ‘black boxes’) were introduced in
the late 1950s for the purpose of indicating flight parameters, especially in case of
accident. The use of SFIM for RES data-gathering was possibly due to Charles
Swithinbank, who used the flight recorder during the BAS airborne mission of
1966–7.82 In land-based missions such as the Greenland experiments the experimenter
would take records of position and RES apparatus performance data in the same
logbook. However, with the beginning of airborne operations, it became necessary to
review these procedures, and deal with navigational and RES data separately. During
the trials in Canada Evans had taken responsibility for recording the data on
RES apparatus performance in one logbook, whereas Robin filled another with
navigational data.83 In this way they pioneered the procedure later adopted in







Figure 5. Charts illustrating the flight lines used during RES missions before (1969–70) and
after (1971–2) the introduction of inertial navigation. The new navigation system allowed the
gathering of data on Antarctica’s ice thickness and bedrock morphology on a ‘grid’ pattern,
which in turn made it easier to process data and compile maps. The first chart is from S. Evans
and B. Smith, ‘Radio echo exploration of the Antarctic ice sheet, 1969–1970’, Polar Record
(1970), 15, 336–8; the second is from S. Evans, D. Drewry and G. Robin, ‘RES in Antarctica,
1971–1972’, Polar Record (1972), 16, 207–12.
80 On land carriers such as the Polecat, an odometer was sufficient for linking position and vertical
measurements. See J. T. Bailey logbooks, 1965, THMA.
81 Produced by the French Société de fabrication d’instruments de mesure (SFIM, now SAGEM).
82 The correlation with the aircraft navigation system was provided by an SFIM using a 60 mm photo-
graphic paper, which carried altitude, temperature, heading and terrain-clearance traces. Anon., op. cit. (73),
211.
83 Ellesmere Island logbooks, 1966, THMA.
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general data on navigation and a ‘radio-echo’ logbook containing data on the RES
performance.84
Integration of radio engineering and avionics was also important, as shown by
the case of antenna installation. The main priority for SPRI personnel was to use
antenna-enhancing pulse detection in the receiver. But considerations of the antenna’s
impact on the aircraft were also important. Larger antennae allowed greater gain, but
dangerously increased the drag on the aircraft.85 Antenna design was assigned to
the SPRI only during the first mission, when the antenna was installed on the C121’s
tailplane.86 During the following mission antenna design was effectively the result of a
collaborative effort between the SPRI and the aircraft producer, Lockheed
Corporation, as well as the aeronautics engineers at the US Naval Air Development
Center based in Warminster, Pennsylvania.87 Later, the antenna design was assigned
to Gudmansen. He developed new ‘butterfly-plan multi-wire dipoles’ which had
weaknesses in design but allowed a significant power gain.88
From the fourth mission the TUD effectively became responsible for the design
and construction of the RES apparatus as well as the antenna design. This left the
SPRI to concentrate on the applications of the equipment to glaciological problems,
confirming their role as the scientific centre of the collaboration supported by
NSF funding, US Navy logistical support and TUD technical support. As the TUD
apparatus worked at two different frequencies it also needed two different aerial
systems. The 60 MHz antenna system was an array of four half-wave dipoles
similar to those previously adopted. The new 300 MHz antenna system used four
dipoles of much smaller dimension.89 Although much changed in antenna design
between 1967 and 1979, the forms of international and interdisciplinary collabora-
tions between scientific and military research institutions continued to be of great
importance.
In summary, the deployment of RES relied upon an efficient system, the NSF
airborne laboratory, which embodied a number of technologies, of which RES appar-
atus was but one. The end result of technological integration was data integration. This
was clearly shown by Drewry in a chart detailing how data-gathering on ice thickness
was only one important aspect of RES missions (Figure 6).90
84 Still available for consultation are seventeen radio echo logs and thirteen glaciologists logs for the second
mission (1969–70); six radio echo logs and ten glaciologists logs for the third mission; twenty-five glaciolo-
gists logs, three TUD panel logs; eight SPRI panel logs for the fourth mission, 1974–5, THMA.
85 Petrie was instrumental in suggesting the use of terminated dipoles rather than half-wave dipoles. On
antenna drag see Laurence Burke, ‘Radar aboard aircraft’, in Encyclopedia of 20th-Century Technology (ed.
C. A. Hempstead and W. A. Worthington, Jr), New York and London, 2004, 621–3, 621.
86 Anon., op. cit. (40), 212.
87 S. Evans and B. Smith, ‘Radio echo exploration of the Antarctic ice sheet, 1969–1970’, Polar Record
(1970), 15, 336–8.
88 Evans, Drewry and Robin, op. cit. (60).
89 See Drewry and Meldrum, op. cit. (72).
90 On data integration see K. Dean, S. Naylor, S. Turchetti and M. Siegert, ‘Data in Antarctic science and
politics’, forthcoming in Social Studies of Science.
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Not just serendipity
The history of RES demonstrates that serendipity can play a vital part in science in
general as well as in twentieth-century big science more specifically. Amory Waite’s and
Stanley Evans’s understanding of the electromagnetic properties of ice derived from
accidental discoveries in research areas that had nothing to do with glaciology. Yet the
realization that Waite’s and Evans’s instruments could be readapted to glaciological
research followed an investigation of the errors marring the functioning of their
apparatus. Waite developed RES whilst examining altimetry errors experienced by
pilots flying over Antarctica, while Evans understood the potential of RES while solving
interference problems affecting ionosphere research. So it was the study of experimental
errors that led to scientific and technological innovation. Using serendipity as an
explanatory framework therefore helps us to understand the transition from glaciology
to radio-glaciology, in that the examination of error analysis was the cornerstone of the
origins of RES.
This paper has also shown that full realization of RES’s potential depended on
changing Antarctic geopolitics. If the early work of Evans and Waite later bore fruit, it
was chiefly because new political circumstances in Cold War Antarctica helped the likes
of Gordon Robin and Albert Crary to establish new forms of international patronage
for glaciological research. Political influence played a key role in transforming acci-
dental scientific findings into large-scale research endeavour. The Antarctic Treaty
let (wealthy) nations participate in SCAR and develop research programmes on the
Figure 6. Drewry’s flow chart. From D. Drewry, ‘RES map of Antarctica’, Polar Record (1975),
17, 362.
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continent, while new Cold War circumstances encouraged nations such as the USA to
support Antarctic science at an unprecedented level after the IGY.91 Glaciologists with
key roles in the administration of Antarctic affairs exploited these circumstances to
promote the development of RES, to test its efficiency and to plan large-scale research in
Antarctica based on the deployment of RES technologies. These opportunities sparked
scientific competition as well as international collaboration between glaciological
groups in Britain, the US and the USSR and ultimately led to the setting up of the
joint SPRI–NSF missions. Moreover, from the IGY onwards a new vision permeated
US science policy: that it would be highly beneficial, from both a propagandistic and a
utilitarian point of view, to design new frontier research as collaborative and
international.92
It is also for this reason that during the RES missions glaciologists could count on
the support of military organizations such as the US Navy. Circumstances after the
IGY made it politically and strategically sound for the US military to aid scientific
research in Antarctica on a large scale. The US Navy did already have a significant
presence in Antarctica and had previously been interested in polar scientific explo-
ration. It was in fact Operation Highjump that marked the beginning of military
influence on Antarctic exploration and research. Yet the new political circumstances
defined by the Antarctic Treaty demanded greater involvement of the US Navy in
Antarctic scientific affairs and the logistical support of research initiatives on a larger
scale.
It is because of the scale of the British–American–Danish effort that our coverage of
the history of RES in Antarctica is centred on the NSF-funded research initiative. This
was the only project in which long-range aircraft were deployed and the only one aimed
at covering the entire continent. But this was by no means the only attempt successfully
to use RES in Antarctica. In 1969 a Belgian team led by glaciologist Tony van
Autenboer used RES instrumentation installed on a Otter plane in the context of a joint
Belgian–South African project. This was, however, short-lived due to Belgian oppo-
sition to the apartheid regime, which thwarted future collaboration.93 An Australian
team also deployed ground-based and airborne RES in the context of explorations of
the Lambert Glacier Basin between 1968 and 1974. Finally, between 1967 and 1979 the
Russians continued to use their RES apparatus in the context of the Soviet Antarctic
expeditions. It is also worth noting that after the end of the SPRI–NSF collaboration,
many different small-scale RES projects have provided a more detailed picture of the
glaciological and geophysical structures of Antarctica and that these projects continue
now.94
91 See S. Naylor, M. Siegert, K. Dean and S. Turchetti, ‘Science, geopolitics and the governance of
Antarctica’, Nature Geosciences (2008), 1, 143–5.
92 Korsmo, op. cit. (33).
93 A. Enzinga, ‘Geopolitics, science and internationalism during and after the IGY’, 2nd Workshop of the
SCAR Action Group on the History of Antarctic Research, Santiago, 21–2 September 2006.
94 Recent airborne RES projects in Antarctica have been discussed by F. Ferraccioli and J. W. Holt in the
context of the ‘Post-international polar year: geophysical exploration of Antarctica’ session during the
American Geophysical Union fall meeting, 11–15 December 2006.
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Antarctic big science also won military support because of potential strategic uses
that this paper has only investigated to a limited extent. The ‘airborne laboratory’
was a new concept put forward within the NSF to unite basic science surveys and
reconnaissance in Antarctica. For example, the use of photogrammetry was essential to
both.95 The military potential of RES also did not go unnoticed. In fact SPRI and TUD
personnel were asked to develop new RES systems to spot Vietnamese forces hiding in
the jungle, a proposal they promptly refused.96 Apart from the technique, maps offered
important data for future explorations. Drewry’s final publication was funded through
important British and US oil concerns, possibly with a view to the potential value of
Antarctica’s natural resources, following a decade in which oil and other resource ex-
ploration had been one of the preoccupations of the Antarctic Treaty Organisation.97 In
the history of RES, scientific, military and industrial concerns were soldered together.
Political and strategic urgencies moved RES from a state of contingency to one of
planning. Technological needs defined the final phase of RES’s deployment, typified by
military-style campaigns in which errors were reduced to a minimum. RES had become
part of a complex technological system relying upon a number of components whose
functioning had to be coordinated, integrated and synchronized. Yet technological in-
tegration may also have been the cause of the termination of the RES missions in 1979.
Despite there being forty per cent of the land mass still to survey, the NSF took the
decision to end their support for the project, a decision partly due to a data-handling
policy at the SPRI that did not suit American science managers.98 Changing priorities
and new technologies also played a part : Antarctic exploration was no longer con-
sidered as important as, for example, remote sensing through satellites.99 Finally, the
complex technological system set up in the 1960s had begun to show cracks. The last
two missions were not successfully completed and a number of problems made it im-
possible to fly the amount of hours originally planned.100 These problems had high-
lighted the fact that growing complexity and integration also augmented the system’s
unreliability. If one of its parts were faulty the whole system could be affected. The last
mission completed only less than fifty per cent of planned flying hours.101
95 Cloud and Clarke, op. cit. (8), 261–82. See also J. Cloud, ‘Imaging the world in a barrel : CORONA and
the clandestine convergence of the earth sciences’, Social Studies of Science (2001), 31, 231–51.
96 Interview with Dr C. Swithinbank in Cambridge, UK, 2 June 2004. The plausibility of such potential
developments of RES was confirmed by the fact that Evans later went on to develop soil-sounding techniques
for application to archaeological research.
97 Dean et al., op. cit. (90), 19.
98 Dean et al., op. cit. (90), 15–17.
99 ‘Exploration is no longer the prime attraction in Antarctic research. Modern satellite photography
provides a wealth of geographical and physical details on an almost routine basis. The contemporary thrust of
Antarctic research is toward examination of significant phenomena for a more comprehensive understanding
of the polar environment in context with global natural and physical problems.’ ‘NSF Science Operation Plan,
1977–1982’, in ‘Long Range Plans’, Box 1, NSF 307/93, NARA.
100 Amongst the problems experienced during the sixth mission there was a cracked tyre, damage to the
port of one external fuel tank that reduced fuel capacity, and problems with one generator that affected the
performance and functioning of electronic apparatus deployed on the aircraft. See D. J. Drewry, D. T.
Meldrum and E. Jankowski, ‘Radio echo and magnetic sounding of the Antarctic ice scheet, 1978–1979’,
Polar Record (1980), 20, 43–57.
101 In 1977–8 only 141 hours of 450 planned were flown.
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In conclusion, as one compelling example of big science in Antarctica, the RES pro-
gramme began and ended with accidents and demonstrated that accidents can work as
windows of opportunity for scientific research, allowing their actors to explore freely
alternative uses of instrumentation. But in the case of RES the exploitation of these
opportunities relied upon much more than the investigators’ sagacity. It depended on
mastery of international scientific and political relations to create interest in newly
found scientific methods and technological tools. As shown by the activities of Robin
and Crary, scientific administration was fundamental in achieving the genuine viability
of enterprises until then merely foreseen through a set of accidental discoveries. In turn,
the administration of large-scale technological networks was equally decisive in
changing freewheeling scientific activities into structured data-gathering processes de-
fined by precision and accuracy.
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